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Phantomperception refers to the conscious awareness of a percept in the absence of an external stimulus. On the basis of basic neuroscience
on perception and clinical research in phantom pain and phantom sound, we propose a working model for their origin. Sensory
deafferentation results in high-frequency, gamma band, synchronized neuronal activity in the sensory cortex. This activity becomes
a conscious percept only if it is connected to larger coactivated “(self-)awareness” and “salience” brain networks. Through the involvement
of learning mechanisms, the phantom percept becomes associated to distress, which in turn is reﬂected by a simultaneously coactivated
nonspeciﬁc distress network consisting of the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and amygdala. Memory mechanisms play a role in
the persistence of the awareness of the phantom percept, as well as in the reinforcement of the associated distress. Thus, different
dynamic overlapping brain networks should be considered as targets for the treatment of this disorder.
A
fundamental concept in psy-
chology and philosophy of the
mind is the notion of percep-
tion: The act of interpreting and
organizing a sensory stimulus to produce
a meaningful experience of the world and
of oneself. A stimulus produces an effect
on the different sensory receptors, inducing
sensation. Further processing of this sen-
sory stimulation generates an internal
representation of the outer and inner world
called a percept. Since the ﬁrst days of
psychology, two challenging questions have
existed: How is sensory information en-
coded and, in particular, how is this rep-
resented information transformed into
the individual awareness of a conscious
percept (1)? Our understanding of sensory
encoding, perception, and consciousness is
challenged with a further degree of com-
plexity in the case of phantom perception,
the conscious awareness of a percept in
the absence of an external stimulus. De-
ciphering the underlying neural correlates
of phantom perception is a scientiﬁc en-
deavor that will aid in understanding the
active processes of selecting, organizing,
and interpreting information, which ulti-
mately lead to the formation of a con-
scious percept within the brain.
Although some cases of phantom per-
cepts have been described for the visual,
olfactory, and gustatory systems, the vast
majority of sensory phantoms are those
present in the somatosensory (phantom
limb perception/phantom limb pain and
neuropathic pain) (2) and auditory (tinni-
tus) (3) modalities. Upfront we are chal-
lenged with the following questions: In the
absence of an external sensory stimulus,
where and how in the brain is the con-
scious percept generated? In addition, are
the neural substrates underlying the gen-
eration of a conscious phantom percept
similar for the auditory and somatosensory
modalities? If so, can we advance in our
understanding and treatment of tinnitus
on the basis of what is known for phantom
limb and phantom pain perception and
vice versa? Here, we address these ques-
tions and propose a working model of how




Activation of nociceptive pathways can
trigger brain responses without necessarily
causing the feeling of pain, and pain can
occur in the absence of activation of
nociceptors (4). Neuropathic pain is pain
resulting from lesions of the peripheral or
central nervous system (5), and phantom
limb pain belongs to the group of neuro-
pathic pain syndromes (2). Acute noci-
ceptive pain and neuropathic pain have
distinct although overlapping brain acti-
vation patterns in the insula, anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC), prefrontal cortex,
secondary somatosensory cortex, and
thalamus (6). After limb amputation al-
most all people experience a phantom
limb (2), whereas 70% suffer from severe
phantom pain (2).
In a similar way, stimulus-evoked audi-
tory cortical activation does not necessarily
produce conscious auditory perception
(7), and auditory perception is possible in
the absence of auditory input: More than
80% of people with normal hearing per-
ceive phantom sounds when placed in
a soundproof room (8). In addition, dep-
rivation of auditory input can result in an
auditory phantom phenomenon called
tinnitus. Whereas some people just per-
ceive the phantom sound without being
bothered, others suffer severely from their
tinnitus (9).
Thus, a clear clinical analogy exists be-
tween phantom pain and disabling tinnitus
(10, 11): (i) Both symptoms are wholly
subjective perceptions and may change in
character and quality and (ii) both symp-
toms occur in the deafferented area. The
frequency spectrum of the tinnitus reﬂects
the individual’s hearing loss (12), neuro-
pathic pain is felt as coming from the area
that was initially innervated by the injured
neural structure (2), and phantom pain is
perceived in the missing body part (2, 13).
The latter has to be differentiated from
residual limb (or stump) pain in the still-
present body part, adjacent to the ampu-
tation or deafferentation line (2). (iii)
Both symptoms can be transiently masked
and relieved by electrical stimulation of
their respective sensory cortex (14) and
(iv) similar characteristic symptoms exist
in tinnitus and phantom pain (11). For
example, a touch stimulus to the skin in
patients with neuropathic pain can create
a painful sensation (allodynia) and tinnitus
patients frequently perceive speciﬁc
sounds as unpleasant or painful (miso-
phonia). A painful stimulus in neuropathic
pain patients often generates an explosive
and prolonged reaction to the stimulus
(hyperpathia), similar to the hyperacusis
seen in some tinnitus patients. Further-
more, a feeling of anxiety and stress re-
sponses is often encountered in both
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phantom pain and tinnitus patients, which
can lead to sleep disturbances, concentra-
tion problems, fatigue, depression, anxiety
disorders, and sometimes even to suicide
in both clinical conditions (11).
However, there are also differences be-
tween pain and tinnitus. Whereas speciﬁc
nociceptive pathways lead to physiological
nociceptive pain, no analogous physiolog-
ical tinnitus pathways exist. This observa-
tion might account for the fact that, in
general, analgesics that are quite efﬁcient
for acute physiological body pain are not
efﬁcient for the treatment of tinnitus (15).
Also, medications such as antiepileptics
and antidepressants, which are effective in
the treatment of neuropathic pain (15),
are generally ineffective for tinnitus (16).
Primary Sensory Cortex and Beyond:
Conscious Perception
Herman Melville’s Captain Ahab follow-
ing the loss of his leg in a skirmish with the
big white whale Moby Dick perceives
a phantom leg and phantom pain, and
Ludwig von Beethoven, after losing his
hearing, perceives tinnitus constantly, re-
sulting in a “wretched life.” Deprivation of
sensory input triggers changes in the cen-
tral nervous system, resulting in phantom
percepts.
Both animal (17) and human functional
neuroimaging studies (2) demonstrate that
phantom limb pain is associated with cor-
tical map plasticity resulting in somato-
sensory cortex reorganization and that the
more pronounced the reorganization is,
the more severe the phantom pain (2, 18).
Similarly, animal (19) and human data
(20) demonstrate that cortical map plas-
ticity in the auditory cortex is associated
with tinnitus and that the more pro-
nounced the reorganization is, the more
severe the tinnitus is perceived (20). Fur-
thermore, these remapping changes nor-
malize when the pain (21) or the tinnitus
improves (22). Topographic development
and reorganization in all sensory areas of
adult cortex are governed by similar/com-
mon mechanisms of synaptic plasticity
(23), likely explaining the analogy between
phantom pain and tinnitus.
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) stud-
ies have demonstrated that nociceptive
stimuli induce gamma oscillations in the
primary somatosensory cortex (S1) and
that they vary with objective stimulus in-
tensity and subjective pain intensity (24).
MEG studies have also shown that audi-
tory stimuli elicit gamma band activity in
the auditory cortex (25, 26) and that
γ-band activity in the sensory cortex cor-
relates with phantom pain (27) and tinni-
tus (27, 28). Moreover, electroenceph-
alography studies have demonstrated that
γ-band activity in the auditory cortex re-
ﬂects the tinnitus intensity (29), analogous
to intensity coding in normal auditory
perception (30). The γ-band activity noted
in tinnitus patients goes along with de-
creased α (31) and increased θ activity
(27, 32). This coupled θ–γ activity coor-
dinates activity in distributed cortical
areas, providing a mechanism for effective
communication between these distrib-
uted areas (33). The θ–γ coupling has also
been shown on intracranial recordings in
a patient with tinnitus, which disappears
when tinnitus is suppressed by electrical
stimulation of the auditory cortex (34).
The thalamocortical dysrhythmia model
provides an explanation for the emer-
gence and persistence of such a pattern
as a consequence of sensory deafferen-
tiation (27).
Are these map plasticity and oscillatory
changes in the primary sensory cortices
the neural correlate of the conscious
phantom percept? More detailed data
derived from recordings of the somato-
sensory system in nonhuman primates in-
dicate that S1 is not sufﬁcient for the
generation of a percept and have impli-
cated association cortex and frontal lobe
involvement in perception (35), analogous
to what has been described for the visual
(36) and auditory systems (37). Thus, it
has been demonstrated that the activity of
S1 neurons covaries with the stimulus
strength but not with the animal’s per-
ceptual reports. In contrast, the activity of
frontal lobe neurons does not covary with
the stimulus strength but does so with the
animal’s perceptual reports (38). More-
over, the transition from sensation to
perception gradually builds up across cor-
tical areas, starting at the somatosensory
cortex and ending in the premotor areas
of the frontal lobe, which might have
a hidden sensory function (39). Consistent
with this interpretation is the fact that the
artiﬁcial activation of clusters of S1 neu-
rons is sufﬁcient to drive the full cascade
of cognitive events leading to somatosen-
sory perception (40). In addition, very re-
cent studies performed in monkeys are
giving hints that what has been described
for the somatosensory cortex can be ex-
trapolated to the auditory cortex (41).
According to these observations, we could
speculate that weak transitions in activity
of deafferented sensory cortices trigger
abnormal processing across cortical cir-
cuits, leading to phantom perceptions.
However, phantom perceptions are not
necessarily induced only by the triggering
signals of sensory cortices. Perceptual
systems are formed by interconnected
circuits forming distributed systems (42)
and therefore phantom perceptions
could be generated in any part of the
distributed system.
Human imaging studies have given fur-
ther insight into the neural correlates of
conscious perception. For example, brain
activity and functional connectivity in
patients in a persistent vegetative state,
a condition where patients are awake but
without awareness and without conscious
percepts (43), show that loss of awareness
is associated with decreased metabolism in
the anterior and posterior cingulate, pre-
cuneus, and frontoparietotemporal areas
in comparison with that in normal subjects
(43). These “awareness areas” anatomi-
cally overlap with the brain’s default net-
work areas (44), which might also be in-
volved in self-awareness (44, 45). In these
persistent vegetative state patients, pain
stimuli activate the thalamus and S1,
but this primary cortex is functionally dis-
connected from the secondary somato-
sensory cortex as well as from the above-
mentioned awareness areas (43, 46, 47).
Similarly, in these patients activation in-
duced by auditory stimulation is restricted
to the primary auditory cortex (A1) bi-
laterally, without functional connectivity
to the inferior parietal cortex, the hippo-
campus, the anterior cingulate, and the
posterior cingulate (43, 48, 49).
Taken together, these results indicate
that the function of the primary sensory
cortices is mainly to generate an appro-
priate neural discriminatory representation
of the sensory input, which does not lead to
conscious perception. A stimulus becomes
conscious only when functionally con-
nected to a network of frontal and parietal
areas. This network, together with the
posterior insula (50), is relevant for the
integration of sensory experiences in
bodily self-consciousness (51, 52). The
posterior insula triggers the pain network
and the resulting emergence of subjective
pain experience (53), possibly because of
its involvement in the genesis of our sense
of limb ownership and self-awareness (54).
Furthermore, a pain (55) or an auditory
stimulus (56) delivered near threshold
becomes consciously perceived only when
the dorsal ACC (dACC) and anterior in-
sula are activated, i.e., when the stimuli
are salient (4, 57), meaning behaviorally
relevant or functionally signiﬁcant (58).
This concept is consistent with the “global
workspace model” of consciousness pro-
posed by Baars (59) and further elabo-
rated by others (36, 60), on the basis of
studies of the visual system.
Neuroimaging studies have conﬁrmed
the relevance of the coactivation of frontal
and parietal areas together with A1 in
tinnitus (61, 62). Nonpainful phantom
phenomena have been shown to be more
closely related to activation of S1 and
the posterior parietal cortex, without ac-
tivation of the secondary somatosensory
cortex (63) and without cortical reorgani-
zation (64), whereas phantom limb pain
is related to activation of the thalamus, the
ACC, and the lateral prefrontal cortex
(65), similarly to neuropathic pain in
general (6), and is associated with plastic
8076 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1018466108 De Ridder et al.
changes in S1 (50, 64). The reorganization
of A1 in tinnitus (20) and the activation of
the ACC and the lateral prefrontal cortex
in bothersome tinnitus (9) therefore sug-
gest that distressing tinnitus and phantom
pain are more similar than nonbother-
some tinnitus and nonpainful phantom
phenomena.
Incongruence, Pain, and Tinnitus
Multisensory mechanisms involving cross-
modal congruency are involved in bodily
self-consciousness (66–68), and cross-
modal illusions are observed in most con-
ditions in which there is incongruence
among two or three stimuli of different
modalities (auditory, visual, somatosen-
sory) (69). Whereas synchronous stimula-
tion of external objects, such as a rubber
hand, can lead to the illusion of body
ownership (70), asynchronous stimulation
in one sensory modality or between the
senses can lead to abnormal sensory per-
ception (71, 72). On the basis of this
concept it has been proposed that in-
appropriate cortical representation of
proprioception may falsely signal in-
congruence between motor intention and
movement, resulting in pathological pain
in the same way that incongruence be-
tween vestibular and visual sensation re-
sults in motion sickness (73). This sen-
sorimotor conﬂict can also induce pain
in healthy volunteers (72). In this sense,
phantom limb pain could hypothetically be
related to a temporal incongruence be-
tween what is stored in memory (the
presence of the limb) and deprivation of
sensory input (the absence of the limb).
Thus, when a mirror box is used to re-
instate the congruence between what was
stored in memory and what is seen, the
pain can disappear (74).
Incongruence between auditory and vi-
sual input can alter auditory perception,
as in the well-known McGurk effect (75).
Whether multisensory incongruence is
involved in tinnitus has not been investi-
gated yet.
Beyond Sensory Percepts: The
Affective Dimension
Pain has sensory (discriminative) and af-
fective (the “unpleasantness”) dimensions
and can induce an avoidance behavior
(76). Likewise, hearing has a sensory and
an affective component and can induce
avoidance behaviors. Moreover, affective
disorders such as anxiety and depression
frequently occur together with tinnitus
(77). Data based on evoked potentials in
humans with implanted electrodes in sev-
eral brain structures indicate that painful
stimuli are processed in parallel in the
somatosensory cortex and dACC (78),
suggesting that the affective and discrimi-
natory aspects are processed simulta-
neously and not serially.
MEG studies are aiding toward delin-
eating the network connectivity underly-
ing the affective components of phantom
perception. Thus, the presence of distress
in tinnitus is related to a network activity,
lateralized to the right hemisphere (79).
The amount of distress is reﬂected by
functional alterations in a network con-
sisting of the medial temporal lobe (amyg-
dala and hippocampus), parahippo-
campal areas, insula, and subgenual ACC
(sgACC) and dACC (9). This network
activation seems to be nonspeciﬁc, because
pain distress but also distress in dyspnea
(80) or social rejection (81) activate the
ACC and anterior insula (9).
It is of interest to note that the areas
related to the salience network and the
distress component of pain and tinnitus
overlap with brain areas involved in central
control of the autonomic system, which
include sgACC, dACC, insula, hypothala-
mus, and amygdala (82). This overlap
supports the idea that the autonomic sys-
tem is also involved in bringing the phan-
tom percepts to consciousness, ﬂavored
by an emotional component, as described
in the neurophysiological model for tinni-
tus (83) and similar pain models (2, 84).
Phantom Percepts and Memory
Almost every amputee experiences a
phantom percept (13), but not everybody
perceives the phantom as aversive or
painful (2, 13). Likewise, not every tinnitus
patient experiences tinnitus as aversive or
bothersome. In addition, many patients
describe their phantom pain as triggered
by stressful life events (85), and tinnitus is
more common in patients suffering post-
traumatic stress disorder (86).
What mechanism turns a phantom per-
cept into an ongoing aversive phenomenon
that cannot be extinguished? Behaviorally
relevant or functionally signiﬁcant experi-
ences tend to be well remembered. This
observation is reﬂected by coactivation of
the dACC and the anterior insular cortex
that form a salience network (57). Func-
tional connectivity studies demonstrate
a prolonged enhanced functional coupling
in the resting state between amygdala,
dACC, anterior insula, and the sympa-
thetic locus coeruleus after psychological
stress, resulting in an extended state of
hypervigilance that promotes sustained
salience and mnemonic processing (87).
Thus, the efﬁcient encoding of aversive
emotional memories can lead to the for-
mation of a strong, aversive memory trace
(88). Pain can induce single-event learn-
ing, the memory of which can last for the
rest of life. A negative emotional context
increases pain perception and this is con-
comitantly associated with increased neu-
ral activity in the anterior insula mediated
Fig. 1. Brain networks involved in phantom perception. Sensory deafferentation causes neuroplastic
changes resulting in increased activation of the primary sensory cortex: somatosensory cortex (gray) in
the case of phantom pain and auditory cortex (brown) in the case of tinnitus. Awareness of the stimulus
arises when this activity is connected to a larger coactivated awareness or perceptual network. This
perceptual network involves subgenual (sgACC) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and pos-
terior cingulate cortex (PCC), precuneus, parietal cortex, and frontal cortex (blue). Salience to the
phantom percept is reﬂected by activation of dACC and anterior insula (yellow). As a consequence of
a constant learning process, the phantom percept becomes associated to distress, which is reﬂected by
a nonspeciﬁc distress network consisting of the anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC and dACC), anterior
insula, and amygdala (red). The persistence of the phantom percept is due to memory mechanisms in-
volving the parahippocampal area, amygdala, and hippocampus (green).
De Ridder et al. PNAS | May 17, 2011 | vol. 108 | no. 20 | 8077
by the amygdala and parahippocampus
(89). In this regard, many people with
amputations report phantom limb pain
that is similar in both quality and location
to pain experienced before the amputa-
tion. Moreover, pain experiences before
the amputation are powerful predictors
and elicitors of phantom limb pain (2).
These observations point to the existence
of a pain memory system that entrains the
chronically persisting phantom pain. The
continuous experience of pain produces
continuous aversive emotional associa-
tions and does not provide an opportunity
for extinction of the memory of pain (84).
This self-reinforcement process is similar
to what has been described in posttrau-
matic stress disorder, where anxiety and
distress are perpetuated by an overactive
emotional memory in the amygdala to-
gether with a lack of contextual memory in
the hippocampus (88).
In the case of tinnitus, enhanced activity
of the amygdala is evidenced by c-fos ex-
pression in animal models (90, 91), by
source-localized electroencephalography
(9), by positron emission tomography im-
aging (92), and by transient tinnitus dimi-
nution after suppression of the amygdalo-
hippocampal complex by amytal (93).
Hippocampal deﬁcits have been docu-
mented in animal models of tinnitus and
structural imaging in tinnitus patients has
demonstrated a decrease in gray matter in
the hippocampus (94). Structural deﬁcits
have also been observed in the sgACC/
nucleus accumbens area (sgACC/Nac)
and, on the basis of these ﬁndings, it has
been postulated that tinnitus is the result
of a deﬁcient sensory attentional gating
mechanism, originating in the sgACC/
Nac and acting on the reticular thalamic
nucleus (95). This nucleus accumbens-
related inhibitory system is analogous to the
nucleus accumbens-based antinociceptive
system implicated in pain suppression
(96). This sensory gating deﬁciency is
likely mediated via the parahippocampal
area, which has a sensory gating function
for irrelevant or redundant auditory input
(97). The parahippocampal area has been
hypothesized to play a central role in
memory recollection, sending information
from the hippocampus to the association
areas, and a dysfunction in this mechanism
is posited as an explanation for complex
auditory phantom percepts such as audi-
tory hallucinations (98). As the para-
hippocampal area is involved in tinnitus
and tinnitus distress (9), a similar mecha-
nism could be proposed for tinnitus.
Moreover, chronic stress is known to re-
duce neuroplasticity in the hippocampus
and to reduce connectivity between hip-
pocampus and sgACC (99). Thus, we
suggest that the deﬁcient thalamic gating
function emerges as a consequence of an
aversive tinnitus memory together with
chronic stress and represents an additional
factor contributing to the perpetuation of
the phantom percept.
In brief, we hypothesize that both tin-
nitus and phantom pain are perceptual
states of continuous learning, where—in
the absence of an external input—the
phantom percept is reinforced and the
connection with aversive emotional asso-
ciations is continuously updated.
Working Model
We propose that phantom perception
arises as the consequence of multiple
parallel overlapping dynamic brain net-
works (Fig. 1). Thus, any altered activity
across these brain networks could gener-
ate a phantom perception for any sensory
modality. This interpretation casts doubts
concerning the sole participation of only
one critical circuit in phantom perception.
Phantom percepts result from sensory
deafferentation and reach awareness only
when increased neuronal activity in the
primary sensory cortex is connected to
a larger coactivated awareness or global
workspace brain network, involving frontal
and parietal areas. Activity in a salience
network consisting of the dACC and an-
terior insula is required for the percept to
reach consciousness. This salience net-
work overlaps with a central autonomic
control system and also inﬂuences limbic–
auditory and –somatosensory interactions
that are essential for maintaining the
percept into consciousness. These inter-
actions are mediated by the sgACC/Nac
and amygdala, modulating the reticular
nucleus of the thalamus and thereby po-
tentially further contributing to thalamo-
cortical dysrhythmia. Memory mechanisms
play a role in the persistence of the
awareness of the salient phantom percept,
as well as in the reinforcement of the as-
sociated distress. Through the involvement
of learning mechanisms, the phantom
percept becomes associated to distress,
which in turn is reﬂected by a simulta-
neously coactivated nonspeciﬁc distress
network consisting of the parahippo-
campal area, ACC, anterior insula, and
amygdala. Thus, different dynamic and
overlapping brain networks should be
considered as targets for the treatment
of this disorder.
Looking Forward
Our understanding of phantom percep-
tion has evolved from a “peripheral,”
to a “primary sensory cortex,” into
a “static network,” reaching a “dynamic
multiple parallel overlapping network”
problem. Although scientiﬁc under-
standing has advanced in the last decade,
much more has yet to be discovered.
There are several research directions that
promise interesting results in the near
future. Application of new structural
connectivity techniques such as diffusion
tensor imaging and diffusional kurtosis
imaging and correlating these to func-
tional connectivity measures would shed
light on information ﬂow within and
between the parallel networks involved
in phantom perception. These connec-
tivity studies could be further evaluated
by applying network science methodol-
ogy (100) and thus could lead to iden-
tifying ideal targets and stimulation
designs for neuromodulation. Finally,
interventional studies using known and
new drugs or known and new stimula-
tion designs will enable researchers to
prove and reﬁne the proposed working
model.
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